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Evolution of cooperation between individuals

Author

Listed:
  • Arnon Lotem

    (Faculty of Life Sciences, Tel-Aviv University)

  • Michael A. Fishman

    (Faculty of Life Sciences, Tel-Aviv University)

  • Lewi Stone

    (Faculty of Life Sciences, Tel-Aviv University)

Abstract

Nowak and Sigmund1 conclude that cooperation may have evolved through indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Their simulations1 and analytical models1,2 predict long-term cyclical dynamics between cooperative and defector populations rather than an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Here we add a realistic feature to their model: that there are always some individuals unable to cooperate owing to their poor phenotypic condition (we call these individuals ‘phenotypic defectors’). The presence of phenotypic defectors paradoxically allows persistent discriminating cooperation under a much wider range of conditions than found by Nowak and Sigmund because there is selection against both defection and unconditional altruism. In real populations there will nearly always be some level of defection because phenotypic defectors (such as the young, sick or handicapped) may be unable to help even if they have a genetic predisposition to do so.

Suggested Citation

  • Arnon Lotem & Michael A. Fishman & Lewi Stone, 1999. "Evolution of cooperation between individuals," Nature, Nature, vol. 400(6741), pages 226-227, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:nature:v:400:y:1999:i:6741:d:10.1038_22247
    DOI: 10.1038/22247
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chengzhang Ma & Wei Cao & Wangheng Liu & Rong Gui & Ya Jia, 2013. "Direct Sum Matrix Game with Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(12), pages 1-7, December.
    2. Suzuki, Shinsuke & Akiyama, Eizo, 2008. "Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 426-436.
    3. Isamu Okada, 2020. "A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-17, July.
    4. Kurokawa, Shun, 2022. "Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 63-79.
    5. Berger, Ulrich, 2011. "Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 30-37, May.
    6. Bolton, Gary E. & Katok, Elena & Ockenfels, Axel, 2005. "Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1457-1468, August.
    7. Cao, Lixuan & Wu, Bin, 2021. "Eco-evolutionary dynamics with payoff-dependent environmental feedback," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    8. Presbitero, Alva & Monterola, Christopher, 2018. "Challenging the evolution of social cooperation in a community governed by central control," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 511(C), pages 378-388.
    9. Yamamoto, Hitoshi & Okada, Isamu, 2016. "How to keep punishment to maintain cooperation: Introducing social vaccine," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 443(C), pages 526-536.
    10. Banerjee, Prasenjit & Shogren, Jason F., 2012. "Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 137-149.
    11. Mike Mesterton-Gibbons & Tom Sherratt, 2011. "Information, variance and cooperation: minimal models," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 419-439, September.
    12. Janssen, Marco A., 2008. "Evolution of cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma based on recognition of trustworthy and untrustworthy agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 458-471, March.

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