IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/thpobi/v145y2022icp63-79.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent

Author

Listed:
  • Kurokawa, Shun

Abstract

It is worth investigating the existence of cooperation, which is costly for the actor but beneficial to the recipient (precisely because it is costly for the former). If players, when they approach defectors, stop their relationship with them, cooperation can pay off and favorably emerge in the course of evolutionary dynamics. The present study examines the situation in which animals, even when they want to cooperate, sometimes lack the necessary resources, and are thereby prevented from cooperating with others. In addition, it is also considered that the underlying information about the presence or absence of these resources can be conveyed to the opponent player. Here, the opponent who defects—has no resources for cooperation—may be a cooperator or a defector. Therefore, it is not clear which behavior is more likely to evolve, if it is keeping the interaction with such an opponent (i.e., being trustful) or stopping the interaction with such an opponent (i.e., being not trustful). By using evolutionary game theory, it is revealed that those who want to keep the interaction with those without the resources to cooperate are favored by natural selection. This study sheds new light on the role of keeping and stopping interaction in the evolution of cooperation under variable availability of resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Kurokawa, Shun, 2022. "Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 63-79.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:thpobi:v:145:y:2022:i:c:p:63-79
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2022.03.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040580922000235
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.tpb.2022.03.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kurokawa, Shun & Ihara, Yasuo, 2013. "Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: A payoff transformation in general n-player games and its implications," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 1-8.
    2. Izquierdo, Luis R. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2014. "Leave and let leave: A sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 91-113.
    3. Esther Hauk, 2003. "Multiple Prisoner's Dilemma Games with(out) an Outside Option: an Experimental Study," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 207-229, May.
    4. Tim Clutton-Brock, 2009. "Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies," Nature, Nature, vol. 462(7269), pages 51-57, November.
    5. Deng, Kuiying & Li, Zhuozheng & Kurokawa, Shun & Chu, Tianguang, 2012. "Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 81(4), pages 284-291.
    6. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009. "Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 993-1021.
    7. Kurokawa, Shun & Wakano, Joe Yuichiro & Ihara, Yasuo, 2010. "Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 77(4), pages 257-262.
    8. Kurokawa, Shun & Zheng, Xiudeng & Tao, Yi, 2019. "Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 350(C), pages 209-216.
    9. Shun Kurokawa & Joe Yuichiro Wakano & Yasuo Ihara, 2018. "Evolution of Groupwise Cooperation: Generosity, Paradoxical Behavior, and Non-Linear Payoff Functions," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-24, December.
    10. Fernando P Santos & Francisco C Santos & Jorge M Pacheco, 2016. "Social Norms of Cooperation in Small-Scale Societies," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(1), pages 1-13, January.
    11. Arnon Lotem & Michael A. Fishman & Lewi Stone, 1999. "Evolution of cooperation between individuals," Nature, Nature, vol. 400(6741), pages 226-227, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daniele Nosenzo & Fabio Tufano, 2015. "Entry or Exit? The Effect of Voluntary Participation on Cooperation," Discussion Papers 2015-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    2. Kurokawa, Shun, 2019. "How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 341(C), pages 174-192.
    3. Fukutomi, Masao & Kurokawa, Shun, 2018. "How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 336(C), pages 301-314.
    4. Shun Kurokawa & Joe Yuichiro Wakano & Yasuo Ihara, 2018. "Evolution of Groupwise Cooperation: Generosity, Paradoxical Behavior, and Non-Linear Payoff Functions," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-24, December.
    5. Nosenzo, Daniele & Tufano, Fabio, 2017. "The effect of voluntary participation on cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 307-319.
    6. Premo, L.S. & Brown, Justin R., 2019. "The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 40-48.
    7. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Nobue Suzuki, 2015. "Efficiency may improve when defectors exist," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 423-460, November.
    8. Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
    9. Qu, Xinglong & Zhou, Changli & Cao, Zhigang & Yang, Xiaoguang, 2016. "Conditional dissociation as a punishment mechanism in the evolution of cooperation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 449(C), pages 215-223.
    10. Pin, Paolo & Rogers, Brian W., 2015. "Cooperation, punishment and immigration," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 72-101.
    11. Jiabin Wu, 2017. "Social Hierarchy and the Evolution of Behavior," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(04), pages 1-16, December.
    12. Kurokawa, Shun & Zheng, Xiudeng & Tao, Yi, 2019. "Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 350(C), pages 209-216.
    13. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2013. "Diverse Behavior Patterns in a Symmetric Society with Voluntary Partnerships," Working Papers e062, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    14. Ozgur Aydogmus & Erkan Gürpinar, 2022. "Science, Technology and Institutional Change in Knowledge Production: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Framework," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1163-1188, December.
    15. Friedrich, T., 2009. "Wise exploitation – a game with a higher productivity than cooperation – transforms biological productivity into economic productivity," MPRA Paper 22862, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Schumacher, Heiner, 2013. "Imitating cooperation and the formation of long-term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 409-417.
    17. Som B Ale & Joel S Brown & Amy T Sullivan, 2013. "Evolution of Cooperation: Combining Kin Selection and Reciprocal Altruism into Matrix Games with Social Dilemmas," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(5), pages 1-8, May.
    18. Kene Boun My & Alban Verchere & Stephane Bertrand, 2009. "Does Bilateralism Foster Co‐operation in Europe? An Experimental Approach of Comparative Merits of Bilateralism and Multilateralism," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 891-910, September.
    19. Suzuki, Shinsuke & Akiyama, Eizo, 2008. "Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 426-436.
    20. Jiabin Wu, 2021. "Matching markets and cultural selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(4), pages 267-288, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:thpobi:v:145:y:2022:i:c:p:63-79. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/intelligence .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.