Wise exploitation – a game with a higher productivity than cooperation – transforms biological productivity into economic productivity
I suggest a new game called wise exploitation. It is characterized by a small investment of the exploiting party to either breed the exploited party or educate the exploited party not to detect exploitation. Thereby a higher productivity than cooperation or prisoners´ dilemma is achieved. The higher productivity is a benefit for the group and one party on the cost of the other. To stabilize this an important marginal condition has to be met: the investment (breeding, education) must be overcompensated by the gain. In the light of this suggestion mutualism or symbiotic associations of genetically non related organisms, like leafcutter ants with their fungus or human groups should be reinvestigated.
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- Natasha J. Mehdiabadi & Benjamin Hughes & Ulrich G. Mueller, 2006. "Cooperation, conflict, and coevolution in the attine ant-fungus symbiosis," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 17(2), pages 291-296, March.
- François Mougeot & Justin R. Irvine & Linzi Seivwright & Steve M. Redpath & Stuart Piertney, 2004. "Testosterone, immunocompetence, and honest sexual signaling in male red grouse," Behavioral Ecology, International Society for Behavioral Ecology, vol. 15(6), pages 930-937, November.
- R. Haveman & K. Holden & B. Wolfe & P. Smith & K. Wilson, . "The Changing Economic Status of U.S. Disabled Men: Trends and Their Determinants, 1982–1991," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1190-99, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
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