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Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment

Author

Listed:
  • Hisashi Ohtsuki

    (Tokyo Institute of Technology
    PRESTO, Japan Science and Technology Agency, 4-1-8 Honcho Kawaguchi, Saitama 332-0012, Japan)

  • Yoh Iwasa

    (Faculty of Sciences, Kyushu University)

  • Martin A. Nowak

    (Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA)

Abstract

Reasons to be nice In human societies, altruistic behaviour can evolve when those who fail to co-operate acquire a bad reputation. But how far is it sensible to go on punishing those who don't cooperate, as punishment incurs a cost for both the punisher and the punished? Ohtsuki et al. explore the circumstances under which punishment is favoured using a game theory model in which all individuals observe the interactions between others and assess their reputation according to various social norms. They find that costly punishment can facilitate the evolution of cooperation, but only under a narrow set of parameters. As indirect reciprocity evolves to become more effective, costly punishment is rendered inefficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Hisashi Ohtsuki & Yoh Iwasa & Martin A. Nowak, 2009. "Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment," Nature, Nature, vol. 457(7225), pages 79-82, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:nat:nature:v:457:y:2009:i:7225:d:10.1038_nature07601
    DOI: 10.1038/nature07601
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