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Non-parametric identification and testing of quantal response equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Hoelzemann, Johannes
  • Webb, Ryan
  • Xie, Erhao

Abstract

This paper studies the falsifiability and identification of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) when each player's utility and error distribution are relaxed to be unknown non-parametric functions. Using the variation of players' choices across a series of games, we first show that both the utility function and the distribution of errors are non-parametrically over-identified. This over-identification result further suggests a straightforward testing procedure for QRE which achieves the desired type-1 error and maintains a small type-2 error. To apply this methodology, we conduct an experimental study of the matching pennies game. Our non-parametric estimates strongly reject the conventional Logit choice probability. Moreover, when the utility and the error distribution are sufficiently flexible and heterogeneous, the quantal response hypothesis cannot be rejected for 70% of participants. However, strong assumptions such as linear utility, logistically distributed errors, and homogeneity lead to substantially higher rejection rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoelzemann, Johannes & Webb, Ryan & Xie, Erhao, 2026. "Non-parametric identification and testing of quantal response equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 637-659.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:157:y:2026:i:c:p:637-659
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.004
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    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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