Corporate risk management and dividend signaling theory
This article investigates the effect of corporate risk management on dividend policy. We extend the signaling framework of Bhattacharya [1979. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 259–270] by including the possibility of hedging the future cash flow. We find that the higher the hedging level, the lower the incremental dividend. This result is intuitive. It is in line with studies suggesting that cash flows’ predictability decreases the marginal gain from costly signaling through dividends and the assertion that corporate hedging decreases cash flow volatility. It is also in line with the purported positive relation between information asymmetry and dividend policy (e.g., Miller and Rock [1985. The Journal of Finance 40, 1031–1051]) and the assertion that risk management alleviates the information asymmetry problem (e.g., DaDalt et al. [2002. The Journal of Future Markets 22, 261–267]). Our theoretical model has testable implications.
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- Miller, Merton H & Rock, Kevin, 1985. " Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1031-1051, September.
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- Joan Farre-Mensa & Roni Michaely & Martin Schmalz, 2014. "Payout Policy," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 75-134, December.
- Allen, Franklin & Michaely, Roni, 2003. "Payout policy," Handbook of the Economics of Finance,in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 337-429 Elsevier.
- Franklin Allen & Roni Michaely, 2002. "Payout Policy," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 01-21, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Brav, Alon & Graham, John R. & Harvey, Campbell R. & Michaely, Roni, 2005. "Payout policy in the 21st century," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 483-527, September.
- Alon Brav & John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey & Roni Michaely, 2003. "Payout Policy in the 21st Century," NBER Working Papers 9657, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Froot, Kenneth A & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1993. " Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1629-1658, December.
- Kenneth A. Froot & David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 1992. "Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies," NBER Working Papers 4084, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dichev, Ilia D. & Tang, Vicki Wei, 2009. "Earnings volatility and earnings predictability," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1-2), pages 160-181, March.
- Pinghsun Huang & Harley E. Ryan & Roy A. Wiggins, 2007. "The Influence Of Firm- And Ceo-Specific Characteristics On The Use Of Nonlinear Derivative Instruments," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 30(3), pages 415-436. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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