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Corporate Risk Management and Dividend Signaling Theory

Author

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  • Georges Dionne
  • Karima Ouederni

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of corporate risk management on dividend policy. We extend the signaling framework of Bhattacharya (1979) by including the possibility of hedging the future cash flow. We find that the higher the hedging level, the lower the incremental dividend. This result is in line with the purpoted positive relation between information asymmetry and dividend policy (e.g., Miller and Rock, 1985) and the assertion that risk management alleviates the information asymmetry problem (e.g., DaDalt et al., 2002). Our theoretical model has testable implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Georges Dionne & Karima Ouederni, 2010. "Corporate Risk Management and Dividend Signaling Theory," Cahiers de recherche 1008, CIRPEE.
  • Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1008
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    Cited by:

    1. J. Barry Lin & Christos Pantzalis & Jung Chul Park, 2017. "Corporate derivatives use policy and information environment," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 159-194, July.
    2. Georges Dionne, 2025. "Causality in Empirical Analyses with Emphasis on Asymmetric Information and Risk Management," Springer Books, in: Georges Dionne (ed.), Handbook of Insurance, edition 0, pages 361-400, Springer.
    3. Koziol, Philipp, 2014. "Inflation and interest rate derivatives for FX risk management: Implications for exporting firms under real wealth," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 459-472.
    4. Rosa Lombardi & Daniela Coluccia & Giuseppe Russo & Silvia Solimene, 2016. "Exploring Financial Risks from Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from Italian Listed Companies," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 7(1), pages 309-327, March.
    5. Choi, Young Mok & Park, Kunsu & Kim, Woo Sung, 2020. "Corporate hedging and dividend policy: An empirical study of Korean firms," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 32(C).
    6. Gao, Chengyin & Zhang, Shujun, 2025. "ESG performance and corporate financialization: A dual perspective of risk management and value creation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    7. Mike Adams & Wei Jiang & Tianshu Ma, 2024. "CEO power, corporate risk management, and dividends: disentangling CEO managerial ability from entrenchment," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 683-717, February.
    8. Seong Mi Bae & Md. Abdul Kaium Masud & Jong Dae Kim, 2018. "A Cross-Country Investigation of Corporate Governance and Corporate Sustainability Disclosure: A Signaling Theory Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(8), pages 1-16, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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