The determinants of family firms' subcontracting: A transaction cost perspective
In this article we compare the governance choices of family and non-family firms regarding their subcontracting tendencies. Based on transaction cost theory, we argue that family firms are less likely to engage in subcontracting than non-family firms and that kinship ties, the extent to which a family firm's production activities are important, and cost minimization concerns influence the extent to which family firms utilize subcontractors. Using a sample of small, established firms, we find support for our hypotheses as well as for the use of transaction cost theory logic to explain family firm behavior.
Volume (Year): 2 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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