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Men, women, and the ballot: Gender imbalances and suffrage extensions in the United States

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  • Braun, Sebastian
  • Kvasnicka, Michael

Abstract

Women's suffrage led to one of the greatest enfranchisements in history. Voting rights, however, were not won by force or threats thereof, a fact leading political economy theories find hard to explain. Studying the timing of suffrage extensions in US states between 1869 and 1919, we find that a scarcity of women strongly promoted early transitions to women's suffrage. Such scarcity significantly reduced the political costs and risks for male grantors of the suffrage. It might also have made women's suffrage attractive as a means to attract more women.

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  • Braun, Sebastian & Kvasnicka, Michael, 2013. "Men, women, and the ballot: Gender imbalances and suffrage extensions in the United States," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 405-426.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:50:y:2013:i:3:p:405-426
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2013.04.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Bertocchi, Graziella & Bozzano, Monica, 2016. "Women, medieval commerce, and the education gender gap," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 496-521.
    2. Anna Maria Koukal & Reiner Eichenberger, 2017. "Explaining a Paradox of Democracy: The Role of Institutions in Female Enfranchisement," CREMA Working Paper Series 2017-13, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    3. Carolyn Moehling & Melissa A. Thomasson, 2020. "Votes For Women: An Economic Perspective on Women’s Enfranchisement," NBER Working Papers 26781, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Nikolova, Elena & Nikolova, Milena, 2017. "Suffrage, labour markets and coalitions in colonial Virginia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 108-122.
    5. Michèle Tertilt & Matthias Doepke & Anne Hannusch & Laura Montenbruck, 2022. "The Economics of Women’s Rights," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(6), pages 2271-2316.
    6. Kose, Esra & Kuka, Elira & Shenhav, Na'ama, 2016. "Women's Enfranchisement and Children's Education: The Long-Run Impact of the U.S. Suffrage Movement," IZA Discussion Papers 10148, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Koukal, Anna Maria & Schafer, Patricia & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2021. "Enfranchising non-citizens: What drives natives’ willingness to share power?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1088-1108.
    8. Carolyn M. Moehling & Melissa A. Thomasson, 2020. "Votes for Women: An Economic Perspective on Women's Enfranchisement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 3-23, Spring.
    9. Curtis Lockwood Reynolds & Amanda L. Weinstein, 2021. "Gender differences in quality of life and preferences for location‐specific amenities across cities," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(5), pages 916-943, November.
    10. Anna Maria Koukal & Patricia Schafer & Reiner Eichenberger, 2020. "The Trade-off between Deepening and Broadening of Democracy Lessons from Youth Enfranchisement," CREMA Working Paper Series 2020-16, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    11. Anna Maria Koukal & Reiner Eichenberger & Patricia Schafera, 2019. "Enfranchising Foreigners: What Drives Natives’ Willingness to Share Power?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2019-10, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Woman suffrage; Democratization; Political economy; Power sharing; Sex ratio;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N42 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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