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Ocean iron fertilization in the context of the Kyoto protocol and the post-Kyoto process

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  • Bertram, Christine

Abstract

Ocean iron fertilization is currently discussed as a potential measure to mitigate climate change by enhancing oceanic CO2 uptake. Its mitigation potential is not yet well explored, and carbon offsets generated through iron fertilization activities could currently not be traded on regulated carbon markets. Still, commercial interests in ocean iron fertilization already exist, which underlines the need to investigate a possible regulatory framework for it. To this end, I first discuss important basic aspects of ocean iron fertilization, namely its scientific background, quantitative potential, side effects, and costs. In a second step, I review regulatory aspects connected to ocean iron fertilization, like its legal status and open access issues. Moreover, I analyze how the regulations for afforestation and reforestation activities within the framework of the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) could be applied to ocean iron fertilization. Main findings are that the quantitative potential of ocean iron fertilization is limited, that costs are higher than initially hoped, and that potential adverse side effects are severe. Moreover, the legal status of ocean iron fertilization is currently not well defined, open access might cause inefficiencies, and the CDM regulations could not be easily applied to ocean iron fertilization.

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  • Bertram, Christine, 2010. "Ocean iron fertilization in the context of the Kyoto protocol and the post-Kyoto process," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 1130-1139, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:38:y:2010:i:2:p:1130-1139
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    Cited by:

    1. Güssow, Kerstin & Proelss, Alexander & Oschlies, Andreas & Rehdanz, Katrin & Rickels, Wilfried, 2010. "Ocean iron fertilization: Why further research is needed," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 911-918, September.
    2. Rickels, Wilfried & Rehdanz, Katrin & Oschlies, Andreas, 2012. "Economic prospects of ocean iron fertilization in an international carbon market," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 129-150.
    3. Rickels, Wilfried & Rehdanz, Katrin & Oschlies, Andreas, 2009. "Accounting aspects of ocean iron fertilization," Kiel Working Papers 1572, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Rickels, Wilfried & Rehdanz, Katrin & Oschlies, Andreas, 2010. "Methods for greenhouse gas offset accounting: A case study of ocean iron fertilization," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 2495-2509, October.
    5. Tina Sikka, 2018. "Technology, Gender, and Climate Change: A Feminist Examination of Climate Technologies," Societies, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-16, November.
    6. John Byrne & Lado Kurdgelashvili & Job Taminiau, 2012. "Social change to avert further climate change: defining the scale of change and principles to guide a new strategy," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-40, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ocean iron fertilization Kyoto protocol CDM;

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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