IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ejores/v195y2009i1p117-126.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the negative value of information in informationally inefficient markets: Calculations for large number of traders

Author

Listed:
  • Pfeifer, Christian
  • Schredelseker, Klaus
  • Seeber, Gilg U.H.

Abstract

In informationally inefficient markets, classical decision theory assumes the value of information to be positive. Recent developments, however, contradict this paradigm. Schredelseker [Schredelseker, K., 2001. Is the usefulness approach useful? Some reflections on the utility of public information. In: McLeay, S., Riccaboni, A. (Eds.), Contemporary Issues in Accounting Regulation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, pp. 135-153] proposed a simulation model wherein a single security is traded among non-cooperating and asymetrically informed traders. One of the main results was the fact that badly informed traders could expect higher returns than traders with more information. But Schredelseker was able to give exact results for a small number of traders only. The aim of this paper is to give reliable results for a sufficiently large number of traders for both the expected gain and the probability of gain larger than zero. We are using combinatorial methods in order to get exact results for badly informed traders and simulation techniques for results of traders with higher level of information. The exact results are used (error between exact results and simulation results for the first traders) to determine the number of samples which have to be drawn with the simulation algorithm. As a result it was possible to verify the negative value of information on gain for a sufficient large number of traders. Furthermore a partition of expected gain is given. Traders with less information seem to be in advantage because of that part of information which is unknown to them.

Suggested Citation

  • Pfeifer, Christian & Schredelseker, Klaus & Seeber, Gilg U.H., 2009. "On the negative value of information in informationally inefficient markets: Calculations for large number of traders," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 195(1), pages 117-126, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:195:y:2009:i:1:p:117-126
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377-2217(08)00153-7
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:bla:joares:v:13:y:1975:i:1:p:1-15 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Hakansson, Nils H & Kunkel, J Gregory & Ohlson, James A, 1982. " Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for Information to Have Social Value in Pure Exchange," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(5), pages 1169-1181, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Florian Hauser & Bob Kaempff, 2013. "Evolution of trading strategies in a market with heterogeneously informed agents," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 575-607, July.
    2. Choi, Hyung Sik & Schneider, Uwe A. & Rasche, Livia & Cui, Junbo & Schmid, Erwin & Held, Hermann, 2015. "Potential effects of perfect seasonal climate forecasting on agricultural markets, welfare and land use: A case study of Spain," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 177-189.
    3. Florian Hauser & J├╝rgen Huber & Bob Kaempff, 2015. "Costly Information in Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: A Model with Genetic Programming," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 46(2), pages 205-229, August.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:195:y:2009:i:1:p:117-126. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.