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Interest rates and fiscal discipline in monetary unions

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  • Restoy, Fernando

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  • Restoy, Fernando, 1996. "Interest rates and fiscal discipline in monetary unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 1629-1646, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:40:y:1996:i:8:p:1629-1646
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eichengreen, Barry, 1990. "One Money for Europe? Lessons from the US Currency Union," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6ks1k831, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    2. Emerson, Michael & Gros, Daniel & Italianer, Alexander & ,, 1992. "One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198773245.
    3. Liu, Pu & Thakor, Anjan V, 1984. "Interest Yields, Credit Ratings, and Economic Characteristics of State Bonds: An Empirical Analysis: A Note," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(3), pages 344-351, August.
    4. Timothy D. Lane, 1992. "Market Discipline," IMF Working Papers 92/42, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roel Beetsma & Koen Vermeylen, 2007. "The effect of monetary unification on public debt and its real return," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 393-415, December.
    2. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/7162 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Beetsma, Roel & Jensen, Henrik, 2003. "Contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 187-208, October.
    4. Thomas D. Willett, "undated". "A Political Economy Analysis of the Maastricht and Stability Pact Fiscal Criteria," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-33, Claremont Colleges.
    5. Detken, Carsten & Winkler, Bernhard & Gaspar, Ví­tor, 2004. "On prosperity and posterity: the need for fiscal discipline in a monetary union," Working Paper Series 420, European Central Bank.

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