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Monnaie commune, décentralisation et inflation : Hujus Regio, Cujus Pecunia ?


  • Marc Flandreau


[eng] Common Currency,. Decentralization and Inflation :. is the « Westphalian Model » relevant ?. Marc Flandreau. Is there a systematic relation between the organization of the decision making process within a monetary union and the average inflation rate that this union tends to produce ? More specifically, does decentralization leads to higher inflation ? Contrary to Casella and Feinstein [1989] who build on a free rider argument to demonstrate that decentralization means inflation, we argue — on the basis of theoretical and historical analysis — that it is always possible to set up a number of decentralized incentive mechanisms which can be used to ruie out the alleged inflationary bias of decentralized monetary unions. [fre] Existe-t-il un lien systématique entre l'organisation du mécanisme de décision au sein d'une union monétaire et le niveau d'inflation moyen que cette union tend à produire ? Autrement dit, une union décentralisée est-elle inflationniste ? A l'inverse de l'analyse de Casella et Feinstein (1989) qui utilise un argument de type « free rider » pour montrer que décentralisation égale inflation, cet article, en s'appuyant sur une réflexion à la fois théorique et historique, suggère que le prétendu biais inflationniste des unions décentralisées peut être corrigé au moyen de mécanismes eux-mêmes décentralisés.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Flandreau, 1995. "Monnaie commune, décentralisation et inflation : Hujus Regio, Cujus Pecunia ?," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(1), pages 29-47.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1995_num_52_1_1385
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1995.1385

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    3. Flandreau, Marc, 1993. "On the inflationary bias of common currencies : The Latin Union puzzle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 501-506, April.
    4. Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1987. "The optimal collection of seigniorage : Theory and evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 327-341, September.
    5. Eichengreen, Barry, 1990. "One Money for Europe? Lessons from the US Currency Union," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6ks1k831, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    6. Emerson, Michael & Gros, Daniel & Italianer, Alexander & ,, 1992. "One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198773245.
    7. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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