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Monnaie commune, décentralisation et inflation : Hujus Regio, Cujus Pecunia ?

  • Marc Flandreau

[eng] Common Currency, Decentralization and Inflation : is the « Westphalian Model » relevant ? Marc Flandreau Is there a systematic relation between the organization of the decision making process within a monetary union and the average inflation rate that this union tends to produce ? More specifically, does decentralization leads to higher inflation ? Contrary to Casella and Feinstein [1989] who build on a free rider argument to demonstrate that decentralization means inflation, we argue — on the basis of theoretical and historical analysis — that it is always possible to set up a number of decentralized incentive mechanisms which can be used to ruie out the alleged inflationary bias of decentralized monetary unions. [fre] Existe-t-il un lien systématique entre l'organisation du mécanisme de décision au sein d'une union monétaire et le niveau d'inflation moyen que cette union tend à produire ? Autrement dit, une union décentralisée est-elle inflationniste ? A l'inverse de l'analyse de Casella et Feinstein (1989) qui utilise un argument de type « free rider » pour montrer que décentralisation égale inflation, cet article, en s'appuyant sur une réflexion à la fois théorique et historique, suggère que le prétendu biais inflationniste des unions décentralisées peut être corrigé au moyen de mécanismes eux-mêmes décentralisés.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/ofce.1995.1385
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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue de l'OFCE.

Volume (Year): 52 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 29-47

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1995_num_52_1_1385
Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1995.1385
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ofce

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  1. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  2. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  3. Barry Eichengreen., 1990. "One Money for Europe? Lessons from the US Currency Union," Economics Working Papers 90-132, University of California at Berkeley.
  4. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
  5. Flandreau, Marc, 1993. "On the inflationary bias of common currencies : The Latin Union puzzle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 501-506, April.
  6. Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1987. "The optimal collection of seigniorage : Theory and evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 327-341, September.
  7. Emerson, Michael & Gros, Daniel & Italianer, Alexander & ,, 1992. "One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198773245, March.
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