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Observational and reinforcement pattern-learning: An exploratory study

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  • Hanaki, Nobuyuki
  • Kirman, Alan
  • Pezanis-Christou, Paul

Abstract

Understanding how individuals learn in an unknown environment is an important problem in economics. We model and examine experimentally behavior in a very simple multi-armed bandit framework in which participants do not know the inter-temporal payoff structure. We propose a baseline reinforcement learning model that allows for pattern-recognition and change in the strategy space. We also analyse three augmented versions that accommodate observational learning from the actions and/or payoffs of another player. The models successfully reproduce the distributional properties of observed discovery times and total payoffs. Our study further shows that when one of the pair discovers the hidden pattern, observing another’s actions and/or payoffs improves discovery time compared to the baseline case.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Kirman, Alan & Pezanis-Christou, Paul, 2018. "Observational and reinforcement pattern-learning: An exploratory study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 1-21.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:104:y:2018:i:c:p:1-21
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.01.009
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    Cited by:

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    4. Chernulich, Aleksei & Horowitz, John & Rabanal, Jean Paul & Rud, Olga A & Sharifova , Manizha, 2021. "Entry and exit decisions under public and private information: An experiment," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2021/3, University of Stavanger.
    5. Aleksei Chernulich & John Horowitz & Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga Rud & Manizha Sharifova, 2023. "Entry and exit decisions under public and private information: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(2), pages 339-356, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-armed bandit; Reinforcement learning; Payoff patterns; Observational learning;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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