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Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining in Europe 11This paper presents results of the ACCHANGE consortium – SESAR project E02.31 – whose support we gratefully acknowledge. We thank the guest editor and two anonymous referees for their useful comments. We also thank Nicole Adler and Eef Delhaye, as well as seminar participants at EUROCONTROL, OPTION (Amsterdam), ITEA (Oslo), and the USA-Europe ATM conference (Lisbon) for comments on the previous versions

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  • Blondiau, Thomas
  • Glazer, Amihai
  • Proost, Stef

Abstract

This paper studies the behavior of the national air traffic control (ATC) centers in the EU as it relates to bargaining between a union and government. We analyze wage formation, the reactions of ATC's to a price-cap, the slow adoption of new technologies, the reluctance to vertically disintegrate, the slow standardization, and the failures of mergers of neighboring ATC's. The theory is illustrated by using estimated union preference parameters and bargaining power parameters for the government. We find that bargaining power and union preferences vary greatly by country.

Suggested Citation

  • Blondiau, Thomas & Glazer, Amihai & Proost, Stef, 2018. "Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining in Europe 11This paper presents results of the ACCHANGE consortium – SESAR project E02.31 – whose support we gratefully acknowledge. We thank the g," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 48-60.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecotra:v:13:y:2018:i:c:p:48-60
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2017.12.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Air transport control; Political economy; Union bargaining; Governmental subsidy; EU air transport policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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