Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with linear costs: A tale of two paradoxes
Consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with linear cost functions. If the firms produce to stock then no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists. If, however, the firms produce to order then all subgame perfect Nash equilibria involve the firms charging a price equal to marginal cost.
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