Buying and selling in strategic market games
Players may be allowed to both buy and sell the same commodity in a strategic market game. Any outcome of such a game can also be obtained as an outcome of a game in which players either buy or sell. However, an equilibrium allocation of the buy and sell game may not be so in the corresponding buy or sell game as the set of achievable allocations for any player, given others' strategies, is different in these two games.
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- John D. Rogawski & Martin Shubik, 1983.
"A Strategic Market Game with Transaction Costs,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
661, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dubey, P. & Rogawski, J. D., 1990. "Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 285-304.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1994. "Noncooperative general exchange with a continuum of traders: Two models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 253-293, May.
- Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(5), pages 937-68, October.
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