IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v47y1995i2p199-203.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Using capital mobility to enforce commitment

Author

Listed:
  • Lee, Boon Keng

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Lee, Boon Keng, 1995. "Using capital mobility to enforce commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 199-203, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:47:y:1995:i:2:p:199-203
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0165-1765(94)00549-H
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1993. "Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(1), pages 175-195.
    2. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-1231, December.
    3. S. Fischer, 1979. "Dynamic Inconsistency, Co-operation and the Benevolent Dissembling Government," Working papers 248, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    4. Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May.
    5. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "Sustainable Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 783-802, August.
    6. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
    2. Benhabib, Jess & Velasco, Andres, 1994. "On the Economics of Fiscal Populism in an Open Economy," Working Papers 94-22, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    3. Maurice Obstfeld, 1989. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," NBER Working Papers 2869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
    5. Aidt, Toke S. & Magris, Francesco, 2006. "Capital taxation and electoral accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 277-291, June.
    6. Benhabib, Jess & Velasco, Andres, 1996. "On the optimal and best sustainable taxes in an open economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 135-154, January.
    7. Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1997. "Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 282-305, February.
    8. Dai, Darong, 2012. "Comparative Studies on Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game and Dynamic Sequential Game of Economic Maturity," MPRA Paper 44339, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Ambler, Steve & Bouakez, Hafedh & Cardia, Emanuela, 2017. "Does the crowding-in effect of public spending on private consumption undermine neoclassical models?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 399-410.
    10. Martin, Fernando M., 2010. "Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 503-521, March.
    11. Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni, 2002. "Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 617-635, October.
    12. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1998. "Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1299-1329, September.
    13. V. V. Chari, 1988. "Time consistency and optimal policy design," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 17-31.
    14. Gradstein, Mark, 2000. "An economic rationale for public education: The value of commitment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 463-474, April.
    15. Celentani, Marco & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "Reputation in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 109-132, July.
    16. Chang, Roberto, 2001. "Commitment, coordination failures, and delayed reforms," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 123-144, February.
    17. Jorge Soares, Marina Azzimonti, Pierre-Daniel Sarte & Pierre-Daniel Sarte & Jorge Soares, 2006. "Optimal Policy and (the Lack of) Time Inconsistency: Insights from Simple Models," Working Papers 06-08, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
    18. Driskill, Robert, 2006. "Multiple equilibria in dynamic rational expectations models: A critical review," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 171-210, January.
    19. Bassetto, Marco, 2005. "Equilibrium and government commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 79-105, September.
    20. Michael D. Bordo & Finn E. Kydland, 1990. "The Gold Standard as a Rule," NBER Working Papers 3367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:47:y:1995:i:2:p:199-203. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.