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Organizing expertise

Author

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  • Ponce, Carlos J.
  • Guthmann, Rafael R.

Abstract

This paper studies how a decision maker should consult three biased, imperfectly informed experts who may differ in information quality. We examine how the consultation protocol should be designed to elicit truthful reports. We show that (i) truth-telling under sequential consultation implies truth-telling under simultaneous consultation; (ii) the converse holds only when experts have equal information quality, and (iii) order matters under sequential consultation only when experts differ in both bias and information quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Ponce, Carlos J. & Guthmann, Rafael R., 2025. "Organizing expertise," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 257(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:257:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525004963
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112659
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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