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A lower-bound on monopoly profit for log-concave demand

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  • Condorelli, Daniele

Abstract

If demand is log-concave, then a monopolist obtains at least 1/e of the area under the demand.

Suggested Citation

  • Condorelli, Daniele, 2022. "A lower-bound on monopoly profit for log-concave demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:210:y:2022:i:c:s0165176521004407
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110178
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(3), pages 921-957, March.
    2. Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2006. "Log-concave probability and its applications," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Rosa L. Matzkin & Daniel L. McFadden & James C. Moore & Nicholas C. Yann (ed.), Rationality and Equilibrium, pages 217-241, Springer.
    3. Anderson, Simon P. & Renault, Regis, 2003. "Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 253-264, December.
    4. Tsitsiklis, John N. & Xu, Yunjian, 2014. "Efficiency loss in a Cournot oligopoly with convex market demand," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 46-58.
    5. Neeman, Zvika, 2003. "The effectiveness of English auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 214-238, May.
    6. Kremer, Michael, 2018. "Worst-Case Bounds on R&D and Pricing Distortions: Theory and Disturbing Conclusions if Consumer Values Follow the World Income," CEPR Discussion Papers 13241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Condorelli, Daniele & Szentes, Balázs, 2020. "Information design in the holdup problem," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90620, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Michael Kremer & Christopher M. Snyder, 2018. "Worst-Case Bounds on R&D and Pricing Distortions: Theory with an Application Assuming Consumer Values Follow the World Income Distribution," NBER Working Papers 25119, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Daniele Condorelli & Balázs Szentes, 2020. "Information Design in the Holdup Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 681-709.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gui, Qingyun & Huang, Yi C., 2022. "On Condorelli inequality for log-concave demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monopoly; Log-concavity; 1/e;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly

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