Large distributional games with traits
A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT) has recently been presented in Khan et al. (2012, 2013), and we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT).
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- Rath, Kali P., 1996. "Existence and upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium distributions of anonymous games with discontinuous payoffs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 305-324.
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- M. Ali Khan & Kali P. Rath & Yeneng Sun & Haomiao Yu, 2011. "On Large Games with a Bio-Social Typology," Economics Working Paper Archive 585, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
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- M Ali Khan & Yeneng Sun, 1996. "Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players," Economics Working Paper Archive 382, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- M Ali Khan & Yeneng Sun, 2002. "Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players," Economics Working Paper Archive 482, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Khan, M. Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Sun, Yeneng & Yu, Haomiao, 2013.
"Large games with a bio-social typology,"
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Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1122-1149.
- Lawrence E. Blume & William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf & Yannis M. Ioannides, 2010.
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0754, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1984. "On a theorem of Schmeidler," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 201-206, December.
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