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Large distributional games with traits

Author

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  • Khan, M. Ali
  • Rath, Kali P.
  • Yu, Haomiao
  • Zhang, Yongchao

Abstract

A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT) has recently been presented in Khan et al. (2012, 2013), and we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT).

Suggested Citation

  • Khan, M. Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Yongchao, 2013. "Large distributional games with traits," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 502-505.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:3:p:502-505
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.029
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Khan, M. Ali & Sun, Yeneng, 2002. "Non-cooperative games with many players," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 1761-1808 Elsevier.
    2. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1984. "On a theorem of Schmeidler," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 201-206, December.
    3. Rath, Kali P., 1996. "Existence and upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium distributions of anonymous games with discontinuous payoffs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 305-324.
    4. Lawrence E. Blume & William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf & Yannis M. Ioannides, 2010. "Identification of Social Interactions," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0754, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
    5. Noguchi, Mitsunori, 2009. "Existence of Nash equilibria in large games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1-2), pages 168-184, January.
    6. Khan, M. Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Sun, Yeneng & Yu, Haomiao, 2013. "Large games with a bio-social typology," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1122-1149.
    7. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics and Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753.
    8. William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 2001. "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 235-260.
    9. Khan, M. Ali & Yeneng, Sun, 1995. "Pure strategies in games with private information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 633-653.
    10. M. Ali Khan & Kali P. Rath & Yeneng Sun & Haomiao Yu, 2011. "On Large Games with a Bio-Social Typology," Economics Working Paper Archive 585, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    11. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2002. "Identity and Schooling: Some Lessons for the Economics of Education," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1167-1201, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0528-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Khan, Mohammed Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Yu, Haomiao & Zhang, Yongchao, 2017. "On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Large strategic game; Large distributional game; Traits; Saturated probability space; Nash equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing

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