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A Blotto game with Incomplete Information

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  • Adamo, Tim
  • Matros, Alexander

Abstract

We consider a Blotto game with Incomplete Information. A pure-strategy symmetric monotonic Bayesian equilibrium is found and its properties are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Adamo, Tim & Matros, Alexander, 2009. "A Blotto game with Incomplete Information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 100-102, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:1:p:100-102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2003. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 646-671, June.
    2. Szentes, Balazs & Rosenthal, Robert W., 2003. "Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 278-295, November.
    3. Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
    4. Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2007. "Contests with limited resources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 738-748, September.
    5. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21.
    6. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-660, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hodler, Roland & Yektaş, Hadi, 2012. "All-pay war," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 526-540.
    2. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dan Kovenock & David Rojo Arjona & Nathaniel T. Wilcox, 2016. "Focality and asymmetry in multi-battle contests," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-12, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    3. Kim, Jeongsim & Kim, Bara, 2017. "An asymmetric lottery Blotto game with a possible budget surplus and incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 31-35.
    4. repec:eee:jeborg:v:139:y:2017:i:c:p:88-105 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2011. "A Blotto game with multi-dimensional incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(3), pages 273-275.
    6. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    7. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    8. repec:pit:wpaper:509 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Scott Macdonell & Nick Mastronardi, 2015. "Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 183-216, January.
    10. Stefan Homburg, 2011. "Colonel Blotto und seine ökonomischen Anwendungen," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 1-11, February.
    11. Nikoofal, Mohammad E. & Zhuang, Jun, 2015. "On the value of exposure and secrecy of defense system: First-mover advantage vs. robustness," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 246(1), pages 320-330.

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    Keywords

    Blotto game Incomplete Information;

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