The miracle as a randomization device: A lesson from Richard Wagner's romantic opera Tannhäuser und der Sängerkrieg auf Wartburg
In this paper we examine the strategic savviness of the medieval church as portrayed in Richard Wagner's Tannhäuser. We show that the church employed an optimal randomization strategy based on arguments of dominance or trembling-hand perfection. Particular attention is paid to the employed randomization device.
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