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Soft budget constraints and the property rights theory of ownership

  • Eggleston, Karen

Modeling the government make-or-buy decision, Hart and colleagues [Hart, O., Shleifer, S. and Vishny, R.W., 1997, The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1127-1161] assume government providers are exogenously more replaceable than private providers. Instead, we posit government managers' soft incentives arise endogenously from their lack of control rights, because of rationally softer budget constraints.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-4S2661B-1/2/41872edb43a1a46e8598d411865730c2
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 100 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 425-427

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:3:p:425-427
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  1. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1778, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Mathias Dewatripont & Eric Maskin, 2004. "Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9605, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  3. James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2005. "A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint," Working Paper Series 5605, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
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