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Name as incentive: Political accountability without re-election

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  • Wang, Bo
  • Zhao, Dandan

Abstract

We introduce a name market into an overlapping generations model to examine politician selection and accountability in settings where officeholders are not subject to re-election. Our analysis shows that the name market can address both issues. By enabling the acquisition of a reputable name, the market serves as a screening mechanism for identifying competent politicians, while also incentivizing incumbents to maintain a positive reputation. Notably, the name market contributes to political accountability by influencing the selection process itself. Furthermore, we demonstrate that exposure to social networking services (SNS) crowds out the name market, thereby exacerbating the difficulties of maintaining accountability. Our model offers new insights into the regulatory implications of SNS in political environments.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Bo & Zhao, Dandan, 2025. "Name as incentive: Political accountability without re-election," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:151:y:2025:i:c:s0264999325001671
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107172
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    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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