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Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics

  • Antoci, Angelo
  • Gay, Antonio
  • Landi, Massimiliano
  • Sacco, Pier Luigi

We consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategy population game, and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Volume (Year): 32 (2008)
Issue (Month): 12 (December)
Pages: 3877-3894

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Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:32:y:2008:i:12:p:3877-3894
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc

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  1. Peter Diamond & Drew Fudenberg, 1987. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Working papers 465, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Matsui Akihiko & Matsuyama Kiminori, 1995. "An Approach to Equilibrium Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 415-434, April.
  3. Frankel, David M. & Burdzy, Krzysztof & Pauzner, Ady, 2001. "Fast Equilibrium Selection by Rational Players Living in a Changing World," Staff General Research Papers 11923, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  4. Roger Lagunoff, 1997. "On the Evolution of Pereto Optimal Behavior in Repeated Coordination Problems," Game Theory and Information 9707003, EconWPA.
  5. Kiminori Matsuyama, 1990. "Increasing Returns, Industrialization and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 878, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  7. Matsui, Akihiko & Oyama, Daisuke, 2006. "Rationalizable foresight dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 299-322, August.
  8. Hommes, Cars H., 1998. "On the consistency of backward-looking expectations: The case of the cobweb," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(3-4), pages 333-362, January.
  9. Krugman, Paul, 1991. "History versus Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 651-67, May.
  10. Hommes, Cars & Sorger, Gerhard, 1998. "Consistent Expectations Equilibria," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(03), pages 287-321, September.
  11. John Conlisk, 2001. "Costly Predation and the Distribution of Competence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 475-484, June.
  12. Bischi, Gian Italo & Kopel, Michael, 2001. "Equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 73-100, September.
  13. Angelo Antoci & Pier Sacco, 1995. "A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 89-122, June.
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