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Household bargaining and microfinance

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  • Tassel, Eric Van

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  • Tassel, Eric Van, 2004. "Household bargaining and microfinance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 449-468, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:74:y:2004:i:2:p:449-468
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    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-282, March.
    3. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    4. Jonathan Morduch, 1999. "The Microfinance Promise," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1569-1614, December.
    5. Mark M. Pitt & Shahidur R. Khandker, 1998. "The Impact of Group-Based Credit Programs on Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 958-996, October.
    6. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
    7. Kristin Mammen & Christina Paxson, 2000. "Women's Work and Economic Development," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 141-164, Fall.
    8. Hashemi, Syed M. & Schuler, Sidney Ruth & Riley, Ann P., 1996. "Rural credit programs and women's empowerment in Bangladesh," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 635-653, April.
    9. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    10. Kevane, Michael & Wydick, Bruce, 2001. "Microenterprise Lending to Female Entrepreneurs: Sacrificing Economic Growth for Poverty Alleviation?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1225-1236, July.
    11. Shelly Lundberg & Robert Pollak, 2003. "Efficiency in Marriage," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 153-167, September.
    12. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 57-82.
    13. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
    14. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    15. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114.
    16. Goetz, Anne Marie & Gupta, Rina Sen, 1996. "Who takes the credit? Gender, power, and control over loan use in rural credit programs in Bangladesh," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 45-63, January.
    17. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2000. "Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 603-633, Winter.
    18. Rahman, Aminur, 1999. "Micro-credit initiatives for equitable and sustainable development: Who pays?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 67-82, January.
    19. Kabeer, Naila, 2001. "Conflicts Over Credit: Re-Evaluating the Empowerment Potential of Loans to Women in Rural Bangladesh," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 63-84, January.
    20. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
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    1. Augsburg, Britta & Malde, Bansi & Olorenshaw, Harriet & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2023. "To invest or not to invest in sanitation: The role of intra-household gender differences in perceptions and bargaining power," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    2. Ngo, Thi Minh-Phuong & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2012. "Microfinance and gender empowerment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 1-12.
    3. Cassidy, Rachel & Groot Bruinderink, Marije & Janssens, Wendy & Morsink, Karlijn, 2021. "The power to protect: Household bargaining and female condom use," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    4. Wei-Bin ZHANG, 2014. "Gender Discrimination, Education and Economic Growth in a Generalized Uzawa-Lucas Two-Sector Model," Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business, West University of Timisoara, Romania, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 7(1), pages 1-34.
    5. Akpalu, Wisdom & Alnaa, Samuel Erasmus & Aglobitse, Peter B., 2012. "Access to microfinance and intra household business decision making: Implication for efficiency of female owned enterprises in Ghana," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 513-518.
    6. Paolo Casini & Olivia Riera & Paulo Santos Monteiro, 2014. "Labor market effects of improved access to credit among the poor: evidence from Cape Verde," Working Papers of LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance 484951, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance.
    7. Sarah Pearlman, 2014. "Dropouts, Defaulters, and Continuing Borrowers: Client Exit from Microfinance," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 52(4), pages 301-321, December.
    8. Rahul Nilakantan & Deepak Iyengar & Samar K. Datta & Shashank Rao, 2021. "On Ethical Violations in Microfinance Backed Small Businesses: Family and Household Welfare," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 172(4), pages 785-802, September.
    9. Knar Khachatryan & Vardan Baghdasaryan & Valentina Hartarska, 2018. "Is the model loans-plus-savings better for microfinance in ECA? A PSM comparison," Working Paper c5a69366-4231-479c-879d-c, European Microfinance Network.
    10. Wei-Bin Zhang, 2016. "Gender-Differentiated Human Capital And Time Distributions In A Generalized Heckscher-Ohlin Model With Endogenous Physical Capital," Knowledge Horizons - Economics, Faculty of Finance, Banking and Accountancy Bucharest,"Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University Bucharest, vol. 8(2), pages 112-132, June.
    11. Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge & Armando José Garcia Pires, 2020. "Gender, formality, and entrepreneurial success," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 55(4), pages 881-900, December.
    12. Wei Bin Zhang, 2015. "Progressive Income Taxation and Economic Growth with Endogenous Labor Supply and Public Good," European Journal of Economics and Business Studies Articles, Revistia Research and Publishing, vol. 1, September.

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