IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v178y2026ics0304387825000811.html

This business is mine! Intra-household effects of property rights in micro-enterprises

Author

Listed:
  • Pouliquen, Victor

Abstract

This paper studies the intra-household impact of property rights in micro-enterprises. A randomized field experiment on firm formalization in Benin provides exogenous variation in individual property rights. The results reveal significant gender differences. Women entrepreneurs who formalize invest more in their businesses and are more likely to pay to conceal a large windfall transfer from their husbands—a measure of intra-household inefficiency. These findings suggest that while stronger property rights secure and incentivize investment, they may also reduce household cooperation, leading to efficiency losses. Despite this trade-off, women report higher overall well-being when granted formal property rights. In contrast, formalization improves intra-household efficiency for men, likely by reinforcing their authority over household decision-making. Consistently, male entrepreneurs who formalize are more likely to separate business and household finances and to resist pressure to share resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Pouliquen, Victor, 2026. "This business is mine! Intra-household effects of property rights in micro-enterprises," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:178:y:2026:i:c:s0304387825000811
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103530
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387825000811
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103530?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pamela Jakiela & Owen Ozier, 2016. "Does Africa Need a Rotten Kin Theorem? Experimental Evidence from Village Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(1), pages 231-268.
    2. Esther Duflo, 2012. "Women Empowerment and Economic Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1051-1079, December.
    3. Munir Squires, 2024. "Kinship Taxation as an Impediment to Growth: Experimental Evidence from Kenyan Microenterprises," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(662), pages 2558-2579.
    4. Fafchamps, Marcel & McKenzie, David & Quinn, Simon & Woodruff, Christopher, 2014. "Microenterprise growth and the flypaper effect: Evidence from a randomized experiment in Ghana," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 211-226.
    5. Browning,Martin & Chiappori,Pierre-André & Weiss,Yoram, 2014. "Economics of the Family," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521795395, November.
    6. Suresh de Mel & David McKenzie & Christopher Woodruff, 2009. "Are Women More Credit Constrained? Experimental Evidence on Gender and Microenterprise Returns," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(3), pages 1-32, July.
    7. Boltz, Marie & Marazyan, Karine & Villar, Paola, 2019. "Income hiding and informal redistribution: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Senegal," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 78-92.
    8. Arielle Bernhardt & Erica Field & Rohini Pande & Natalia Rigol, 2019. "Household Matters: Revisiting the Returns to Capital among Female Microentrepreneurs," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 141-160, September.
    9. Meinzen-Dick, Ruth & Quisumbing, Agnes & Doss, Cheryl & Theis, Sophie, 2019. "Women's land rights as a pathway to poverty reduction: Framework and review of available evidence," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 72-82.
    10. Chen, Zhiqi & Woolley, Frances, 2001. "A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 722-748, October.
    11. Hallward-Driemeier, Mary & Gajigo, Ousman, 2015. "Strengthening Economic Rights and Women’s Occupational Choice: The Impact of Reforming Ethiopia’s Family Law," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 260-273.
    12. Shelley Clark & Sarah Brauner-Otto, 2015. "Divorce in sub-Saharan Africa: Are Unions Becoming Less Stable?," Population and Development Review, The Population Council, Inc., vol. 41(4), pages 583-605, December.
    13. Doss, Cheryl R. & McPeak, John G., 2006. "Milk Money and Intra-Household Bargaining: Evidence on Pastoral Migration and Milk Sales from Northern Kenya," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25403, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    14. Nava Ashraf, 2009. "Spousal Control and Intra-household Decision Making: An Experimental Study in the Philippines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1245-1277, September.
    15. Udry, Christopher, 1996. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-1046, October.
    16. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Divorce Laws and Family Distress," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(1), pages 267-288.
    17. Shelly Lundberg & Robert Pollak, 2003. "Efficiency in Marriage," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 153-167, September.
    18. John G. McPeak & Cheryl R. Doss, 2006. "Are Household Production Decisions Cooperative? Evidence on Pastoral Migration and Milk Sales from Northern Kenya," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(3), pages 525-541.
    19. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
    20. Deschênes, Sarah & Dumas, Christelle & Lambert, Sylvie, 2020. "Household resources and individual strategies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    21. Goldstein, Markus & Houngbedji, Kenneth & Kondylis, Florence & O'Sullivan, Michael & Selod, Harris, 2018. "Formalization without certification? Experimental evidence on property rights and investment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 57-74.
    22. Walther, Selma, 2018. "Noncooperative decision making in the household: Evidence from Malawi," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 428-442.
    23. Jean-Marie Baland & Catherine Guirkinger & Charlotte Mali, 2011. "Pretending to Be Poor: Borrowing to Escape Forced Solidarity in Cameroon," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(1), pages 1-16.
    24. Benhassine, Najy & McKenzie, David & Pouliquen, Victor & Santini, Massimiliano, 2018. "Does inducing informal firms to formalize make sense? Experimental evidence from Benin," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1-14.
    25. Alessandra Voena, 2015. "Yours, Mine, and Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertemporal Behavior of Married Couples?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2295-2332, August.
    26. Cullen, Claire & Sarthak, Josh & Vecci, Joseph & Talbot-Jones, Julia, 2024. "Female empowerment and male backlash: Experimental evidence from India," Working Papers in Economics 849, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    27. Cheryl Doss, 2006. "The Effects of Intrahousehold Property Ownership on Expenditure Patterns in Ghana," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 15(1), pages 149-180, March.
    28. Roy, Sanchari, 2015. "Empowering women? Inheritance rights, female education and dowry payments in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 233-251.
    29. Marianne Bertrand & Emir Kamenica & Jessica Pan, 2015. "Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(2), pages 571-614.
    30. Alexandre Belloni & Victor Chernozhukov & Christian Hansen, 2014. "High-Dimensional Methods and Inference on Structural and Treatment Effects," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 28(2), pages 29-50, Spring.
    31. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
    32. Wang, Shing-Yi, 2014. "Property rights and intra-household bargaining," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 192-201.
    33. Kaushik Basu, 2006. "Gender and Say: a Model of Household Behaviour with Endogenously Determined Balance of Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(511), pages 558-580, April.
    34. Suresh de Mel & David McKenzie & Christopher Woodruff, 2009. "Returns to Capital in Microenterprises: Evidence from a Field Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 423-423.
    35. Salvatore di Falco & Erwin Bulte, 2011. "A Dark Side of Social Capital? Kinship, Consumption, and Savings," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(8), pages 1128-1151, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jean-Marie Baland & Roberta Ziparo, 2017. "Intra-household bargaining in poor countries," WIDER Working Paper Series 108, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    2. Jean-Marie Baland & Roberta Ziparo, 2017. "Intra-household bargaining in poor countries," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-108, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Gazeaud, Jules & Khan, Nausheen & Mvukiyehe, Eric & Sterck, Olivier, 2023. "With or without him? Experimental evidence on cash grants and gender-sensitive trainings in Tunisia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    4. Matthias Doepke & Michèle Tertilt, 2019. "Does female empowerment promote economic development?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 309-343, December.
    5. Walther, Selma, 2018. "Noncooperative decision making in the household: Evidence from Malawi," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 428-442.
    6. Andrew Hertzberg, 2026. "Time-Consistent Individuals, Time-Inconsistent Households," Working Papers 26-20, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    7. Deschênes, Sarah & Dumas, Christelle & Lambert, Sylvie, 2020. "Household resources and individual strategies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 135(C).
    8. Emma Riley, 2024. "Resisting Social Pressure in the Household Using Mobile Money: Experimental Evidence on Microenterprise Investment in Uganda," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(5), pages 1415-1447, May.
    9. Bulte, Erwin H. & Lensink, Robert & Winkel, Anne B., 2018. "The impact of a gender and business training on income hiding: An experimental study in Vietnam," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 241-259.
    10. Anderson, C. Leigh & Reynolds, Travis W. & Gugerty, Mary Kay, 2017. "Husband and Wife Perspectives on Farm Household Decision-making Authority and Evidence on Intra-household Accord in Rural Tanzania," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 169-183.
    11. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, IZA Network @ LISER.
    12. Andrew Hertzberg, 2024. "Time‐Consistent Individuals, Time‐Inconsistent Households," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(6), pages 3821-3857, December.
    13. Charlotte Ringdal & Ingrid Hoem Sjursen, 2021. "Household Bargaining and Spending on Children: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 88(350), pages 430-455, April.
    14. Arslan, Cansın & Gregg, Daniel & Stringer, Randy, 2024. "Hidden income and its impact on expenditure patterns in Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
    15. Doepke, M. & Tertilt, M., 2016. "Families in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1789-1891, Elsevier.
    16. Eliana Carranza & Aletheia Donald & Florian Grosset‐Touba & Supreet Kaur, 2025. "The Social Tax: Redistributive Pressure and Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(6), pages 2273-2308, November.
    17. Arjan Verschoor & Bereket Kebede & Alistair Munro & Marcela Tarazona, 2019. "Spousal Control and Efficiency of Intra-household Decision-Making: Experiments among Married Couples in India, Ethiopia and Nigeria," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 31(4), pages 1171-1196, September.
    18. Balasubramanian, Pooja & Ibanez, Marcela & Khan, Sarah & Sahoo, Soham, 2024. "Does women's economic empowerment promote human development in low- and middle-income countries? A meta-analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    19. Arielle Bernhardt & Erica Field & Rohini Pande & Natalia Rigol, 2019. "Household Matters: Revisiting the Returns to Capital among Female Microentrepreneurs," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 141-160, September.
    20. Martina Menon & Federico Perali & Marcella Veronesi, 2014. "Recovering Individual Preferences for Non-Market Goods: A Collective Travel-Cost Model," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 96(2), pages 438-457.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:178:y:2026:i:c:s0304387825000811. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.