Are Household Production Decisions Cooperative? Evidence on Pastoral Migration and Milk Sales from Northern Kenya
Market-based development efforts frequently create opportunities to generate income from goods previously produced and consumed within the household. Production within the household is often characterized by a gender and age division of labor. Market development efforts to improve well-being may lead to unanticipated outcomes if household production decisions are noncooperative. We develop and test models of household decision making to investigate intrahousehold decision making in a nomadic pastoral setting from Kenya. Our results suggest that household decisions are contested, with husbands using migration decisions to resist wives' ability to market milk. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 88 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 555 East Wells Street, Suite 1100, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202|
Phone: (414) 918-3190
Fax: (414) 276-3349
Web page: http://www.aaea.org/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Udry, Christopher, 1996. "Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 1010-1046, October.
- Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994.
"Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit,"
94-6, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 94-6, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- John G. McPeak, 2003. "Analyzing and Addressing Localized Degradation in the Commons," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 79(4), pages 515-536.
- Orazio Attanasio & Valerie Lechene, 2002. "Tests of Income Pooling in Household Decisions," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(4), pages 720-748, October.
- Valerie Lechene & Orazio Attanasio, 2002. "Tests of Income Pooling in Household Decisions," Economics Series Working Papers 106, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Agnes R. Quisumbing & John A. Maluccio, 2003. "Resources at Marriage and Intrahousehold Allocation: Evidence from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South Africa," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 65(3), pages 283-327, 07.
- Laferrere, Anne, 2001. " Marriage Settlements," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(3), pages 485-504, September.
- Hoddinott, John & Haddad, Lawrence, 1995. "Does Female Income Share Influence Household Expenditures? Evidence from Cote d'Ivoire," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 57(1), pages 77-96, February.
- Doss, Cheryl R, 2001. "Is Risk Fully Pooled within the Household? Evidence from Ghana," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 101-130, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)