The effect of cost information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power settings
We investigate the influence of total cost of ownership (TCO) information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power settings. Based on social exchange theory and recent literature on information processing, we expect that buyers with detailed TCO information and less power than their negotiation partners may try to (re)gain control over their own outcomes by sharing information. The results of our experiment indicate that the performance disadvantage of less powerful buyers is less pronounced when the buyer has detailed TCO information, whereas more powerful buyers do not seem to be able to profit from TCO information. These somewhat counterintuitive findings are explained through detailed analysis of the buyer's negotiation behavior, which shows that less powerful buyers who have access to TCO data use problem solving techniques more frequently than powerful buyers, who tend to rely on distributive bargaining techniques instead. We conclude that power can motivate a failure to share TCO information, resulting in less effective interfirm negotiation outcomes.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Baiman, Stanley & Rajan, Madhav V., 2002. "Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 213-238, April.
- Shannon W. Anderson & Henri C. Dekker, 2005. "Management Control for Market Transactions: The Relation Between Transaction Characteristics, Incomplete Contract Design, and Subsequent Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(12), pages 1734-1752, December.
- Tomkins, Cyril, 2001. "Interdependencies, trust and information in relationships, alliances and networks," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 161-191, March.
- Windsor, Carolyn A. & Ashkanasy, Neal M., 1995. "The effect of client management bargaining power, moral reasoning development, and belief in a just world on auditor independence," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 20(7-8), pages 701-720.
- Pinkley, Robin L. & Neale, Margaret A. & Bennett, Rebecca J., 1994. "The Impact of Alternatives to Settlement in Dyadic Negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 97-116, January.
- Northcraft, Gregory B. & Neale, Margaret A., 1986. "Opportunity costs and the framing of resource allocation decisions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 348-356, June.
- Bame-Aldred, Charles W. & Kida, Thomas, 2007. "A comparison of auditor and client initial negotiation positions and tactics," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 497-511, August.
- Craft, James A., 1981. "Information disclosure and the role of the accountant in collective bargaining," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 97-107, January.
- Dekker, Henri C., 2004. "Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on appropriation concerns and coordination requirements," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 27-49, January.
- Fisher, Joseph G. & Frederickson, James R. & Peffer, Sean A., 2006. "Budget negotiations in multi-period settings," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 511-528, August.
- Luft, Joan & Shields, Michael D., 2003. "Mapping management accounting: graphics and guidelines for theory-consistent empirical research," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 169-249.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:34:y:2009:i:2:p:245-266. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.