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Contest with cooperative behavior: a note

Author

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  • Raul Caruso

    () (Institute of Economic Policy, Catholic University of the Sacred Heart)

Abstract

The point of departure of this paper is that players in a contest may have mixed motives. On one hand, players have the interest of winning the contest and taking the prize. On the other hand, they could be better off taking part in a contest which implies some cooperative behaviour. This paper presents a contest model characterized by: (1) the existence of a second kind of effort here termed ‘cooperative effort'; (2) an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake; (3) a degree of responsiveness to cooperative efforts. By comparing a basic contest model with the above-mentioned model, it has been shown that players may be better off in a contest which involves some cooperative behaviour. As the asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake becomes larger and larger, even a smaller degree of responsiveness to the aggregate cooperative efforts would make players better off. Eventually, a contest involving also cooperative efforts is less balanced than a pure contest.

Suggested Citation

  • Raul Caruso, 2012. "Contest with cooperative behavior: a note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1747-1754.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00092
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2012/Volume32/EB-12-V32-I2-P169.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kyung Hwan Baik & Shogren, Jason F., 1995. "Contests with spying," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 441-451, September.
    2. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
    3. Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997. "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 201-204.
    4. Gil S. Epstein & Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Lobbying contests with alternative instruments," Economics of Governance, Springer, pages 81-89.
    5. Marco A. Haan & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2003. "Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids," Journal of Economics, Springer, pages 215-235.
    6. Marco A. Haan & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2003. "Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids," Journal of Economics, Springer, pages 215-235.
    7. Ansink, Erik & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2009. "Contested water rights," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 247-260, June.
    8. Raul Caruso, 2008. "Reciprocity in the shadow of threat," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), pages 91-111.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    contest; cooperative and competitive efforts; contest success function;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

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