Excessive entry in a bilateral oligopoly
In a supplementary note to Ghosh and Morita ("Social desirability of free entry: a bilateral oligopoly analysis," 2007, IJIO), an example has been used to show that the condition for insufficient entry holds under the right-to-manage model of a vertically related industry. Using a linear demand curve, this note makes it clear that excessive entry rather than insufficient entry is quite common under a right-to-manage model, and shows that excessive entry occurs if the cost of entry is not very high.
Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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