IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/dse/indecr/v40y2005i1p23-35.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Nash Bargaining versus Market Outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • Nirvikar Singh

    (Department of Economics, Social Sciences 1 University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA)

Abstract

This paper compares the Nash Bargaining Solution and market outcomes in a simple n-person exchange economy. It shows how the two outcomes differ with respect toresponsiveness of equilibrium to differences in the curvature of the utility function, in endowments, and in market positions.

Suggested Citation

  • Nirvikar Singh, 2005. "Nash Bargaining versus Market Outcomes," Indian Economic Review, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, vol. 40(1), pages 23-35, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:dse:indecr:v:40:y:2005:i:1:p:23-35
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    2. K. G. Binmore & M. J. Herrero, 1988. "Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 17-31.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12984 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Philippe Delacote & Gabriela Simonet, 2013. "Readiness and Avoided deforestation policies: on the use of the REDD fund," Working Papers 1312, Chaire Economie du climat.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash Bargaining Solution; Competitive Equilibrium; Risk Aression;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dse:indecr:v:40:y:2005:i:1:p:23-35. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Pami Dua). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deudein.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.