Nash Bargaining versus Market Outcomes
This paper compares the NBS and market outcomes in a simple n-person economy. It shows how the two outcomes differ with respect to responsiveness to differences in risk aversion, endowments, and market positions.
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- K. G. Binmore & M. J. Herrero, 1988. "Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 17-31.
- Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
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