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Liquiditätsmanagement des Eurosystems im Zeichen der Krise

Author

Listed:
  • Marcel Fratzscher
  • Philipp König
  • Claudia Lambert

Abstract

Since the beginning of the crisis, large Target 2 positions developed on the balance sheets of the national central banks in the euro area. At the height of this development in the middle of 2012, the German Bundesbank disclosed Target-claims vis-à-vis the ECB amounting to around 750 billion euro. Since then, the balances decreased and currently amount to 570 billion Euro, which is still considerably higher than before the crisis. Should the monetary union break apart or should individual members exit the currency union, the remaining creditor countries would face substantial losses; in this regard the Target-balances represent a risk for the stable countries within the monetary union. However, it is essentially the liquidity injections of the Eurosystem and the use of liquidity via the Target payment system that aim to prevent such a situation. The support of banks in the crisis countries through the liquidity provisions of the European Central Bank, the assistance being also reflected in the large Target imbalances, constitutes a cushion against adverse developments in capital and financial markets. The support in turn provides the time necessary to implement structural reforms as well as fiscal and bankregulatory measures. These political implications are further discussed in the second report of this DIW Wochenbericht. Im Zahlungssystem der Eurozone, Target 2, sind seit 2007 hohe Verbindlichkeiten der Krisenländer gegenüber den übrigen Mitgliedern der Währungsunion aufgelaufen. Auf dem Höhepunkt dieser Entwicklung Mitte 2012 hatte allein die Deutsche Bundesbank Target-Forderungen in Höhe von 750 Milliarden Euro. Mittlerweile ist dieser Posten auf 570 Milliarden Euro zurückgegangen; er ist damit aber immer noch deutlich höher als vor der Krise. Im Fall eines Auseinanderbrechens der Währungsunion oder des Ausscheidens einzelner Mitglieder müssten die Gläubigerländer erhebliche Forderungsausfälle hinnehmen; insofern stellen die Target-Salden ein Risiko für die stabilen Länder der Währungsunion dar. Allerdings ist die Liquiditätsbereitstellung des Eurosystems darauf gerichtet, gerade diesen Fall zu verhindern. Die Unterstützung der Banken in den Krisenländern durch die Liquiditätshilfen der Europäischen Zentralbank, die auch in den Target-Salden zum Ausdruck kommt, erfüllt eine Pufferfunktion. Sie schafft den zeitlichen Spielraum, der notwendig ist, um strukturelle Reformen sowie fiskalpolitische und bankregulatorische Maßnahmen umzusetzen. Diese politischen Aspekte der Target-Salden werden im zweiten Beitrag des vorliegenden DIW Wochenberichts eingehender diskutiert.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Fratzscher & Philipp König & Claudia Lambert, 2013. "Liquiditätsmanagement des Eurosystems im Zeichen der Krise," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 80(44), pages 3-17.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwob:80-44-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Target 2; Central Bank Liquidity; Euro Area Crisis; Capital Flight;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

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