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Determinanten des Ein- und Ausstiegs von Private-Equity-Häusern in Europa

Author

Listed:
  • Nataliya Barasinska
  • Dorothea Schäfer

Abstract

Private equity (PE) investors tend to invest in well-established companies, pay attention to high risk and shy away from small and opaque companies. They avoid companies with ownership structures that offer little opportunity for exercising influence, since, for example, there is already another dominant owner present or another financial investor holds a stake. Banks as shareholders, however, increase the likelihood of PE entry. The likelihood of PE investors leaving the firm is also lower if a bank owner is present. If PE investors retreat, the former target companies are on average not worse capitalized than companies with ongoing PE investment. The previous targets are better capitalized compared to firms that had never a PE investor during the period of observation. These are the key findings of a DIW study analysing the determinants of entry and exit of private equity houses in European companies. Financiers of PE deals are mainly institutional investors and in case of buy-outs, also lending banks. Loan losses on a broad front are not to be expected. Securitized loans from PE deals are incomparable with securitized subprime mortgage loans and therefore similar destabilizing effects are not to be expected either. The still ongoing financial crisis has shown that access to equity capital is of ultimate importance for companies. With equal treatment of equity and debt in the corporate tax code law makers could crowd out the obvious pre-crisis trend towards increased debt financing of PE transactions. Private-Equity(PE)-Investoren verhalten sich wie normale Anleger und steigen lieber in etablierte Unternehmen ein, achten auf hohe Risiken und schrecken vor kleinen, als intransparent geltenden Firmen eher zurück. Auch scheuen Private-Equity-Investoren tendenziell Unternehmen, deren Eigentümerstruktur wenig Möglichkeiten zur Einflussnahme verheißt, zum Beispiel weil bereits ein anderer dominanter Eigentümer vorhanden ist oder ein anderer Finanzinvestor bereits eine Beteiligung hält. Banken als Anteilseigner erhöhen jedoch die Wahrscheinlichkeit des Einstiegs. Aus Unternehmen mit Bankbeteiligung steigen PE-Investoren im Durchschnitt auch weniger aus. Wenn sich PE-Investorem zurückziehen, sind die vormaligen Zielunternehmen im Durchschnitt nicht schlechter kapitalisiert als Firmen, an denen PE noch beteiligt ist. Im Vergleich zu Firmen, die im Beobachtungszeitraum keinen Private-Equity-Investor hatten, sind die früheren Zielfirmen besser kapitalisiert. Das sind die wesentlichen Befunde einer DIW Studie zum Ein- und Ausstieg von Private-Equity-Häusern bei europäischen Firmen. Die Finanziers von Private-Equity Deals - vor allem institutionelle Anleger und bei Buy-Outs auch Banken - müssen daher keine Kreditausfälle auf breiter Front erwarten. Verbriefte Private-Equity-Übernahmekredite sind nicht mit verbrieften Subprime-Hypothekarkrediten vergleichbar und ähnlich destabilisierende Wirkungen auch nicht zu befürchten. Die noch nicht überwundene Finanzkrise hat die Wichtigkeit des Eigenkapitalzugangs für Unternehmen nachdrücklich gezeigt. Mit der steuerlichen Gleichstellung von Eigenkapital und Fremdkapital könnte man die vor der Krise unübersehbare Tendenz zur verstärkten Kreditfinanzierung von PE-Geschäften zurückdrängen.

Suggested Citation

  • Nataliya Barasinska & Dorothea Schäfer, 2010. "Determinanten des Ein- und Ausstiegs von Private-Equity-Häusern in Europa," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 79(4), pages 39-58.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:79-4-4
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.79.4.39
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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