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Who lends to riskier and lower-profitability firms? Evidence from the syndicated loan market

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  • Iosifidi, Maria
  • Kokas, Sotirios

Abstract

This paper exploits a unique data set on bank-firm relationships based on syndicated loan deals to examine the effect of banks’ credit risk and capital on firms’ risk and performance. Our data set is a multilevel cross-section, which essentially allows controlling for all bank and firm characteristics through respective fixed effects, thus avoiding concerns regarding omitted variables. We find that banks with higher credit risk are associated with more risky firms, with lower profitability and market value. In turn, we find that banks with higher risk-weighted capital ratios lend to riskier firms with less market value. Our results are indicative of a strong adverse selection mechanism and highlight the need to monitor the risky banks more closely, especially as we consider large and influential syndicated loan deals.

Suggested Citation

  • Iosifidi, Maria & Kokas, Sotirios, 2015. "Who lends to riskier and lower-profitability firms? Evidence from the syndicated loan market," MPRA Paper 61942, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:61942
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    Cited by:

    1. Delis, Manthos D. & Iosifidi, Maria & Mylonidis, Nikolaos, 2021. "Industry heterogeneity in the risk-taking channel," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    2. Natalia Nehrebecka, 2018. "Sectoral risk assessment with particular emphasis on export enterprises in Poland," Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci/Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of Economics, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics and Business, vol. 36(2), pages 677-700.
    3. Sivec, Vasja & Volk, Matjaz & Chen, Yi-An, 2018. "Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Capital Buffer Release," MPRA Paper 84323, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Jan 2018.
    4. Luísa Farinha & Sotirios Kokas, 2022. "Real effects of imperfect bank-firm matching," Working Papers w202210, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    5. Natalia Nehrebecka, 2018. "Sectoral risk assessment: evidence from Poland," IFC Bulletins chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), External sector statistics: current issues and new challenges, volume 48, Bank for International Settlements.
    6. Eriko Naiki & Yuta Ogane, 2020. "Bank soundness and bank lending to new firms during the global financial crisis," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(3), pages 513-541, July.
    7. Adachi-Sato, Meg & Vithessonthi, Chaiporn, 2021. "Bank risk-taking and corporate investment: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank-firm relationships; Risk; Performance; Syndicated loans;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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