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Rémunération des dirigeants et gouvernance des entreprises:le cas des entreprises françaises cotées

  • Géraldine Broye

    ()

    (École de Management Strasbourg – LARGE)

  • Yves Moulin

    (École de Management Strasbourg – CESAG)

(VF)Cette étude s’intéresse à l’incidence des mécanismes de gouvernance sur le niveau de rémunération des dirigeants. À partir d’un échantillon de 132 entreprises françaises cotées, nous examinons l’impact des caractéristiques du conseil d’administration, de l’existence d’un comité de rémunération, ainsi que de la structure de propriété sur la rémunération du dirigeant. Nos résultats mettent notamment en évidence que l’existence d’un comité de rémunération affecte la politique de rémunération, mais que son influence diffère selon le type de structure de propriété de l’entreprise. La proportion d’administrateurs indépendants au conseil n’affecte pas, quant à elle, la politique de rémunération des dirigeants.(VA)This study examines the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on CEO compensation. Using a sample of 132 French listed companies, we study whether ownership structure, the characteristics of board and compensation committee, affect the level of CEO compensation. Our results suggest that the presence of compensation committees affects top management pay, which also varies according to the ownership structure. The proportion of independent directors on the board has no impact on CEO compensation.

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Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

Volume (Year): 13 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 67-98.

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Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:13:y:2010:i:q1:p:67-98.
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  1. Ozkan, Neslihan, 2007. "Do corporate governance mechanisms influence CEO compensation? An empirical investigation of UK companies," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 349-364, December.
  2. Gérard Charreaux, 2000. "Le conseil d'administration dans les théories de la gouvernance," Working Papers CREGO 001201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations, revised Dec 2000.
  3. Ronald W. Masulis & Cong Wang & Fei Xie, 2007. "Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1851-1889, 08.
  4. Nikos Vafeas, 2003. "Further Evidence on Compensation Committee Composition as a Determinant of CEO Compensation," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 32(2), Summer.
  5. Laurence Godard & Alain Schatt, 2004. "Caractéristiques et fonctionnement des conseils d'administration français:un état des lieux," Working Papers CREGO 1040201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  6. Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, 2003. "Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2351-2374, December.
  7. Gérard Charreaux, 1998. "La théorie positive de l'agence:lecture et relectures..," Working Papers CREGO 0980901, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
  8. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  9. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  10. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
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