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Rémunération des dirigeants et gouvernance des entreprises:le cas des entreprises françaises cotées

Author

Listed:
  • Géraldine Broye

    () (École de Management Strasbourg – LARGE)

  • Yves Moulin

    (École de Management Strasbourg – CESAG)

Abstract

(VF)Cette étude s’intéresse à l’incidence des mécanismes de gouvernance sur le niveau de rémunération des dirigeants. À partir d’un échantillon de 132 entreprises françaises cotées, nous examinons l’impact des caractéristiques du conseil d’administration, de l’existence d’un comité de rémunération, ainsi que de la structure de propriété sur la rémunération du dirigeant. Nos résultats mettent notamment en évidence que l’existence d’un comité de rémunération affecte la politique de rémunération, mais que son influence diffère selon le type de structure de propriété de l’entreprise. La proportion d’administrateurs indépendants au conseil n’affecte pas, quant à elle, la politique de rémunération des dirigeants.(VA)This study examines the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on CEO compensation. Using a sample of 132 French listed companies, we study whether ownership structure, the characteristics of board and compensation committee, affect the level of CEO compensation. Our results suggest that the presence of compensation committees affects top management pay, which also varies according to the ownership structure. The proportion of independent directors on the board has no impact on CEO compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Géraldine Broye & Yves Moulin, 2010. "Rémunération des dirigeants et gouvernance des entreprises:le cas des entreprises françaises cotées," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 13(1), pages 67-98., March.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:13:y:2010:i:q1:p:67-98.
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    File URL: http://crego.u-bourgogne.fr/images/stories/rev/131098.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laurence Godard & Alain Schatt, 2004. "Caractéristiques et fonctionnement des conseils d'administration français:un état des lieux," Working Papers CREGO 1040201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    2. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    3. Gérard Charreaux, 2000. "Le conseil d'administration dans les théories de la gouvernance," Working Papers CREGO 001201, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations, revised Dec 2000.
    4. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
    5. Gérard Charreaux, 1998. "La théorie positive de l'agence:lecture et relectures..," Working Papers CREGO 0980901, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    6. Ozkan, Neslihan, 2007. "Do corporate governance mechanisms influence CEO compensation? An empirical investigation of UK companies," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 349-364, December.
    7. Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, 2003. "Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2351-2374, December.
    8. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    9. Nikos Vafeas, 2003. "Further Evidence on Compensation Committee Composition as a Determinant of CEO Compensation," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 32(2), Summer.
    10. Ronald W. Masulis & Cong Wang & Fei Xie, 2007. "Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1851-1889, August.
    11. Peter Wirtz, 2008. "Les meilleures pratiques de gouvernance d'entreprise," Post-Print halshs-00746263, HAL.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chiraz Ben Ali & Frederic Teulon, 2014. "CEO Monitoring and board effectiveness: Resolving CEO compensation issue," Working Papers 2014-45, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    2. Mohamed Khenissi & Peter Wirtz, 2013. "Processus Decisionnel En Matiere De Remuneration Des Dirigeants : Le Cas Vinci," Working Papers halshs-00850083, HAL.
    3. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-045 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    rémunération des dirigeants; gouvernance des entreprises; comités de rémunération; CEO compensation; corporate governance; compensation committees.;

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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