Further Evidence on Compensation Committee Composition as a Determinant of CEO Compensation
I use more than 1,500 firm-year observations for 271 US firms between 1991-1997 to examine the relation between insider membership in compensation committees and CEO pay. I find a steady decline in the number of committees with insider participation during the sample period, and uncover some opportunism by insiders in setting pay prior to the compensation disclosure and tax reforms. Finally, I document changes in pay practices that would be consistent with the intent of these reforms. Based on this evidence, however, I cannot definitively conclude whether the reforms were efficient.
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Volume (Year): 32 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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