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Performance des Grands Groupes et Stratégies de rétribution des dirigeants


  • TREPO, Georges
  • ROUSSEL, Patrice

    (LIRHE, Universite des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse)


In today's managerial world (corporate governance, shareholders' wealth maximization, agency theory) how are CEOs paid in the 700 layest French firms ? What are the various components of total compensation: fixed camp, bonus fringes, stock options ? What parties influence the mix and amounts : board, compensation committee, CEO himself, etc. ? On what criteria is CEOs' compensation based : objective / subjective criteria, short term / medium term, etc. ? What ratio between the various layers of employees from CEO to workers? How and where are CEOs recruited ? These are the major questions to which we produce answers. We also tests various theories like tournament or compensation as a key element of social status.

Suggested Citation

  • TREPO, Georges & ROUSSEL, Patrice, 1999. "Performance des Grands Groupes et Stratégies de rétribution des dirigeants," Les Cahiers de Recherche 665, HEC Paris.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0665

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    More about this item


    CEO compensation; agency theory; corporate governance;

    JEL classification:

    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation


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