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Impact du cadre légal sur le revenu des actionnaires:preuve par la non-normalité

  • Cécile Kharoubi-Rakotomalala

    ()

    (ESCP-EAP European School of Management)

  • Christophe Moussu

    ()

    (ESCP-EAP European School of Management)

Registered author(s):

    (VF)Cet article propose un modèle de l’incidence du cadre légal sur la forme du revenu des actionnaires. Le modèle permet de traiter successivement le droit des créanciers, le droit des actionnaires et la réglementation du travail. Le modèle révèle des différences dans l’asymétrie du revenu d’un actionnaire minoritaire, en fonction du degré de réglementation sur chacun des axes légaux retenus. Les prédictions sont testées sur 21 pays de l’OCDE en recourant à une méthodologie empirique qui étudie l’impact des différences de réglementation sur la distribution de la rentabilité des actions. Les résultats des tests empiriques valident le modèle de partage de valeur sous des régimes juridiques différents, mettant en évidence l’importance de l’effet du cadre légal sur le revenu que s'approprient les actionnaires.(VA)We present a model of the effects of legal frameworks on the structure of shareholders’ payoffs. This model takes into account the legal protection of creditors, the legal protection of shareholders and the regulation of the labor market. It reveals differences in the asymmetry of payoffs to minority shareholders, depending on the degree of regulation for each legal dimension. The predictions are tested for a sample of 21 OECD countries using a new empirical approach, looking at the impact of regulation on the distribution function of stock returns. The results of the empirical evidence validate the value sharing model under different legal regimes. This provides new evidence in favour of the importance of the legal factors to understand the value delivered to shareholders.

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    Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 185-223

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    Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:11:y:2008:i:q1:p:185-223
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