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Monopolized Land Supply and Excessive Leverage of Local Governments in China

Author

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  • Changlin Luo

    (School of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry University)

Abstract

In China, a distinctive feature is that all land is publicly owned, encompassing two forms: state-owned and collectively owned. However, only state-owned land is permitted to sell in the land market, establishing a monopoly on its supply by local governments. Alongside selling land to enterprises, local governments also utilize it to establish financing vehicles, using them as paid-in capital for borrowing in the financial market. This study emphasizes the relationship between land supply and the leverage of local government financing vehicles in contemporary China. The study finds that an increase in land not only raises the amount of debt but also leads to an increase in the leverage ratio, results a much larger amount of debt than under given leverage ratio, which is referred to as excessive leverage. This occurs through both revenue and risk channels, increasing the probability of project termination, and causing greater economic losses in the state of termination.

Suggested Citation

  • Changlin Luo, 2023. "Monopolized Land Supply and Excessive Leverage of Local Governments in China," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 24(2), pages 309-328, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2023:v:24:i:2:luo
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations

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