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Economic Significance of British Labor Law Reform

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  • Charles G. Hanson

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  • Charles G. Hanson, 1987. "Economic Significance of British Labor Law Reform," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(3), pages 851-868, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:cto:journl:v:6:y:1987:i:3:p:851-868
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    File URL: http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1987/1/cj6n3-8.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles Rowley & Anne Rathbone, 2013. "The political economy of antitrust," Chapters, in: Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand (ed.), The International Handbook of Competition – Second Edition, chapter 6, pages 169-206, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schmidt, Klaus-Dieter, 1989. "Lehren aus der Arbeitslosigkeit: Das Vereinigte Königreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich," Kiel Working Papers 383, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Soltwedel, Rüdiger & Bothe, Adrian & Hoffmeyer, Martin & Laaser, Claus-Friedrich & Lammers, Konrad & Merz, Monika & Reuter, Dieter, 1990. "Regulierungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt der Bundesrepublik," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 418, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Schmidt, Klaus-Dieter, 1990. "Mehr Arbeitsplätze durch weniger Regulierung: Britische Erfahrungen mit einer anderen Arbeitsmarktpolitik," Kiel Working Papers 406, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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