The industrial structure of the California Assembly: Committee assignments, economic interests, and campaign contributions
This paper examines the provision of campaign contributions made by economic interests to incumbents seeking reelection in the 1984, 1986, and 1988 California Assembly elections. The study tests whether the distribution of campaign contributions by specific industrial sectors corresponds to legislator possession of the policy property rights associated with membership on relevant Assembly standing committees. A non-parametric statistical model compares the distribution of campaign contributions from groups within a given industrial sector to members of relevant policy committees with the distribution of contributions from all other contributor classes. The empirical analysis confirms that committee assignments significantly affect the allocation of special interest resources in Assembly elections, substantiating the importance of institutional considerations in influencing special interest activity. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Charles Rowley & Anne Rathbone, 2004. "Political Economy of Antitrust," Chapters, in: The International Handbook of Competition, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Kevin Grier & Michael Munger, 1986. "The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 349-361, September.
- Snyder, James M, Jr, 1992. "Long-Term Investing in Politicians; or, Give Early, Give Often," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 15-43, April.
- Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
- Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C & Torrent, Gary M, 1990. "Allocation Patterns of PAC Monies: The U.S. Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 111-28, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:94:y:1998:i:1:p:67-83. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.