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The Origin Rent-Seeking Concept


  • Gordon Tullock

    (School of Law, George Mason University, U.S.A.)


Possibly as a prelude to a mini series of critical review essays, this short paper is intended to revisit and clarify Tullock's contributions to the concept of rent-seeking. Some subsequent contributions are highlighted, so are its implications on social costs and wealth transfers.

Suggested Citation

  • Gordon Tullock, 2003. "The Origin Rent-Seeking Concept," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 2(1), pages 1-8, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:2:y:2003:i:1:p:1-8

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Charles Rowley & Anne Rathbone, 2013. "The political economy of antitrust," Chapters,in: The International Handbook of Competition – Second Edition, chapter 6, pages 169-206 Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pyastolov Sergey & Shitenkova Elena, 2012. "Power – property core of economic development: the cases of Russia and South Korea," Journal of Economic Regulation Journal of Economic Regulation (Вопросы регулирования экономики), CyberLeninka;Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Гуманитарные перспективы», vol. 3(4), pages 93-108.
    2. Peter Zweifel & Friedrich Breyer, 2012. "The Economics of Social Health Insurance," Chapters,in: The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 12 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Jac C. Heckelman, 2017. "Tullock on the organization of scientific inquiry," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-17, March.

    More about this item


    rent-seeking; social costs; transfers; political economy;

    JEL classification:

    • B30 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior


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