How Does Free Trade Become Institutionalized? An Expected Utility Model of the Chretien Era
This paper seeks to go beyond the question of 'why free trade?' and pursues issues related to the tendency for controversial free trade agreements to become institutionalized. In other words, why do opponents of free trade not mobilize to overturn it? Even more puzzling, why do opposition parties, which had opposed passage of free trade in the first place, not undo liberalization undertaken by their predecessors upon coming to power? Rather than seek reversal, it is not uncommon for free trade opponents, upon assuming control of the government, to deepen liberalization initiatives, hence serving to institutionalize the very policies they had decried vigorously. Six sections make up this study. It begins with a statement of the basic puzzle and an illustration in the recent Canadian context. The second is a theoretical discussion of opposition parties and free trade. An expected utility model, based on the limits of rent-seeking, is introduced in the third section to explain institutionalized free trade. The fourth section provides the background to the case at hand, that is, the evolution of free trade as a politico-economic issue in Canada. The fifth section applies the expected utility model to the superficially puzzling case of Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien's dramatic about-face on the issue of trade liberalization after coming to power. Sixth, and finally, the contributions of the model are reviewed, along with directions for future research.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Economic Policy Research Institute, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2|
Phone: 519-661-2111 Ext.85244
Web page: http://economics.uwo.ca/research/research_papers/epri_workingpapers.html
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
- Charles Rowley & Anne Rathbone, 2004. "Political Economy of Antitrust," Chapters, in: The International Handbook of Competition, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Lake, David A., 1988. "The state and American trade strategy in the pre-hegemonic era," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(01), pages 33-58, December.
- Staiger, R.W., 1994.
"A Theory of Gradual Trade Liberalization,"
9405, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uwo:epuwoc:20044. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.