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El agotamiento del régimen fordista boliviano y la financiarización de YPFB

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  • Susan Velasco Portillo

Abstract

Resumen La teoría de la regulación plantea el paso progresivo de un régimen de acumulación intensiva, orientado a la producción de bienes de consumo, a otro de tipo patrimonialista, que se caracteriza por la financiarización de la economía, en el que los títulos fungibles tienen un rol determinante en las relaciones entre los actores. Y uno de los mayores efectos de este nuevo modelo es el impacto directo sobre la gestión de las empresas. En este sentido, este artículo busca demostrar la plena vigencia de esta teoría, a través del estudio de caso de la economía boliviana y de la companía petrolera estatal. La financiarización modificó la arquitectura organizacional de YPFB, propició la llegada de inversores institucionales y auspició la flexibilización laboral y el patrimonialismo individual de los trabajadores. Abstract The theory of regulation raises the gradual transition from a regime of intensive accumulation, oriented to the production of consumer goods, to another of patrimonialist nature, characterized by the financialization of the economy, where expendable securities have a decisive role in relations between actors. And one of the biggest effects of this new model is the direct impact on corporate governance. In this sense, this article seeks to demonstrate the full effect of this theory, through the case study of the Bolivian economy and the state oil company. Financialization changed the organizational architecture of YPFB, led to the arrival of institutional investors and sponsored labor flexibility and individual patrimonialism of workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Susan Velasco Portillo, 2015. "El agotamiento del régimen fordista boliviano y la financiarización de YPFB," Revista Lebret, Universidad Santo Tomás - Bucaramanga, vol. 7, pages 308-325, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000385:016127
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    File URL: http://revistas.ustabuca.edu.co/index.php/LEBRET/article/view/1529/1202
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Boyer, Robert, 1999. "Dos desafíos para el siglo XXI: disciplinar las finanzas y organizar la internacionalización," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financiarización; teoría de la regulación; Bolivia; hidrocarburos.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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