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Time Consistent Matrimony with Endogenous Trust

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  • Dufwenberg, Martin

    (Stockholm University)

Abstract

A simple model of marriage and divorce predicts that no marriages occur. Yet, in real life, people marry all the time in seemingly similar situations. This discordance is explained using psychological game theory. An emotional guilt effect is explicitly modeled and multiple belief-dependent equilibria become possible: some marriages don’t happen, some are formed but end in divorce, some last a lifetime. For certain parameterizations a lifelong efficient marriage is guaranteed; one spouse’s approval to marry signals a trust so strong as to force the other spouse to hold beliefs which make divorce exceedingly emotionally unattractive. These results may have some bearing also on other partnerships than marriage.

Suggested Citation

  • Dufwenberg, Martin, 1996. "Time Consistent Matrimony with Endogenous Trust," Working Paper Series 1997:1, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:1997_001
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    File URL: http://www.nek.uu.se/pdf/1997wp1.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Ruffle, Bradley J., 1999. "Gift giving with emotions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 399-420, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anderlini, Luca & Terlizzese, Daniele, 2017. "Equilibrium trust," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 624-644.
    2. Arnout van de Rijt & Vincent Buskens, 2006. "Trust in Intimate Relationships," Rationality and Society, , vol. 18(2), pages 123-156, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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