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Public-Private Partnership: Allheilmittel für die Finanzkrisen der öffentlichen Haushalte oder Risikofaktor?

Author

Listed:
  • Gerold Krause-Junk
  • Frank Littwin
  • Dietrich Budäus
  • Birgit Grüb
  • Lars P. Feld
  • Jan Schnellenbach

Abstract

Public Private Partnership (PPP) findet in Deutschland in den letzten Jahren immer mehr Verbreitung. Die Bandbreite für PPP-Projekte reicht von Bundesfernstraßen bis zu Schulen, Verwaltungsgebäuden, Krankenhäusern, Schwimmbädern etc. Führt dieses Modell zu einer Optimierung von Kosten und Erträgen oder stellt es einen Risikofaktor für den öffentlichen Sektor dar? Gerold Krause-Junk, Universität Hamburg, sieht darin vor allem einen Weg, den Konflikt zwischen "Effizienz- und Verteilungszielen" zu entschärfen: "Die allokative Aufgabe wird dann dem privaten bzw. einem weitgehend nach privatwirtschaftlichem Kalkül handelnden Anbieter überlassen; die Verteilungsaufgabe bleibt beim Staat ..." Für Frank Littwin, Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, sind die PPP-Projekte kein Allheilmittel und auch kein wesentlicher Beitrag zur Haushaltskonsolidierung, sie führen aber zu deutlich mehr Kostentransparenz und befördern wirtschaftliches Handeln. Und nicht zuletzt sind sie ein wichtiges Instrument zur Verwaltungsmodernisierung. Dietrich Budäus und Birgit Grüb, Universität Hamburg, betonen, dass die Wirtschaftlichkeitsbeurteilung bei PPP-Projekten eine Reihe von Problemen aufwirft. Und für Lars P. Feld und Jan Schnellenbach, Universität Heidelberg, hängt die finanzpolitische Sinnhaftigkeit von PPP-Arrangements von den Details der Kooperation ab. Dabei sollte der öffentliche Sektor vor allem die langfristigen Folgekosten seiner Investitionen im Blick haben, wenn er die Zusammenarbeit mit den Privaten sucht.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerold Krause-Junk & Frank Littwin & Dietrich Budäus & Birgit Grüb & Lars P. Feld & Jan Schnellenbach, 2006. "Public-Private Partnership: Allheilmittel für die Finanzkrisen der öffentlichen Haushalte oder Risikofaktor?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 59(24), pages 03-16, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:59:y:2006:i:24:p:03-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Private Partnership; Öffentlicher Sektor; Öffentlicher Haushalt; Finanzmarktkrise; Deutschland;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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