How to Pay Family Doctors: Why "Pay per Patient" is Better Than Fee for Service
Physician compensation accounts for about one-fifth of all Canadian healthcare spending. But physicians’ decisions, particularly those made by primary care doctors, are the conduit for the majority of the system’s costs. The incentives physicians have to promote efficiency, therefore, affect the overall quality and value of healthcare services. We believe that a remuneration model for primary care doctors that emphasizes per-patient payments is the best way for health systems to pay its front-line doctors, although it is less applicable to specialists. Further, we believe that over time the capitation scheme could be extended so that primary care physicians would keep track of the costs of their referrals and prescribed treatments, to encourage the most appropriate and cost-effective methods of treatment and make better use of total health system resources.
Volume (Year): (2012)
Issue (Month): 365 (October)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Åke Blomqvist & Pierre Thomas Léger, 2003.
"Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize,"
Departmental Working Papers
wp0305, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
- Blomqvist, Ake & Leger, Pierre Thomas, 2005. "Information asymmetry, insurance, and the decision to hospitalize," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 775-793, July.
- Åke Blomqvist & Pierre Thomas Léger, 2001. "Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize," Cahiers de recherche 01-03, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Åke Blomqvist & Pierre Thomas Léger, 2002. "Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-06, CIRANO.
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